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Articles
FEDERAL FIREARMS PROSECUTIONS:

A

PRIMER

By Phillip S. Jackson

Introduction

For the past several years, the U.S. Attorney's Office, in coordination with the Bureau ofAlcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms and area police departments, has increasingly pursued in the U.S. District Court the prosecution of
persons with previous criminal felony convictions found in
possession offirearms. Until recently, in almost all such
cases, there was the prospect of greater punishment for
those convicted in the federal courts of such a crime than
in the state courts of Maryland. I The purpose of this article is to acquaint the criminal practitioner with a variety
of salient issues he or she will confront when involved in a
case where a client faces federal firearm charges.
The Crime
In the majority of cases pursued under this federal
firearms initiative, the primary charge is an alleged violationof18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(I)(2002), colloquially known
as a "felon in possession" charge. 2 That statute reads, "It
shall be unlawful for any person who has been convicted
in any court of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a
term exceeding one year, to ... possess in or affecting
commerce, any firearm or ammunition."3 Although prosecutions initiated under this statute usually involve the alleged illegal possession of a handgun, note that it is also
unlawful for a convicted felon to possess firearm ammunition. 4 Indeed, a significant minority offederal firearm prosecutions involved defendants in possession ofammunition
without a handgun. 5 The bail and sentencing provisions
outlined below apply with equal weight to those charged
with either unlawful possession ofa firearm or illegal possession ofammunition. 6
To convict a defendant for unlawful possession of a
firearm by a felon, the government must prove three basic
elements: (1) that the defendant possessed a firearm or
ammunition; (2) that prior to his or her possession ofthat
weapon or ammunition, the defendant had suffered a dis33.1 U. Bait L.F. 2

qualifying criminal conviction; and (3) that the firearm or
ammunition affected interstate commerce. 7 Adefendant
convicted ofa Section 922(g) violation faces a ten-year
maximum term of imprisonment, except in those cases
where because ofhis or her prior criminal record a defendant is considered an "armed career criminal" as defined
by 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).8,9 The "armed career criminal"
provisions of Section 924(e) are explored in more detail
below. 10
Although the mens rea aspect ofthis crime requires
the government to prove defendant knowingly possessed
a firearm, it is not necessary that the government prove
defendant knew that his or her possession was unlawful,
that he or she knew ofhis or her prior felony conviction,
or that he or she knew the firearm was somehow involved
in interstate commerce. I I, 12
The lion's share oflitigation in these cases center on
search and seizure issues and the possession element of
the crime. Whether a particular weapon is a firearm,
whether a defendant has been previously convicted of a
disqualifying crime, and whether the firearm or ammunition affects interstate commerce are not typically points of
contention at trial. 13
The definition of "firearm" is found at 18 U.S .C.
§ 921(a)(3), and includes:
(A) any weapon (including a starter gun) which
will or is designed to or may readily be converted
to expel a projectile by the action of an exploSIve;
(B) the frame or receiver of any such weapon;
(C) any firearm muffler or firearm silencer; and
(D) any destructive device. 14
By that definition, the government need not allege or
prove that the firearm is operable. 15 Antique firearms are
excluded from the definition of"firearm" and, therefore,
from application ofthe criminal statute. 16 "Ammunition"
as defined by 18 U.S.C. §922(a)(17)(2002), includes
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"cartridge cases, primers, bullets [and] propellant powder designed for use in any firearm. "17
For the element concerning a defendant's prior criminal conviction to apply, it is only necessary that the
defendant's prior criminal conviction subjected him or her
to a potential penalty of incarceration of more than one
year. It is immaterial that the actual sentence meted out
involved no term of imprisonment or a term of imprisonment ofless than a year; however, a misdemeanor conviction under state law and punishable by less than two
years incarceration would not disqualify a defendant from
lawful firearm possession under 18 U .S.C. § 922(g)( 1).18.
19 So, for example, a defendant whose only prior conviction was for a misdemeanor theft in Maryland (a crime
whose maximum sentence is eighteen months) could not
be federally prosecuted under Section 922(g)( 1) for unlawful possession of a firearm. 20
As it is seldom tactically advantageous to have the
prior criminal conduct of one's client accentuated at trial,
this is an element that is typically readily stipulated to by
defense counsel. When addressed as a stipulation, the
district court judge should only allow evidence ofthe fact
ofthe disqualifying conviction. 21 No information about
the nature or circumstances ofthat conviction should be
imparted to the jury.22 When linked with an appropriate
limiting instruction to the jury, the potential prejudicial effect of the client's prior criminal record can thereby be
kept to a minimum. 23
With an eye to that legislation, the best course of
action for a practitioner representing a client charged with
a Section 922(g) violation may be to request a pre-sentence report very soon after entering the case. The district court can, at its discretion, order a pre-sentence report even where a defendant has not yet been convicted
of the crime with which he or she has been charged. In
the normal course of investigation, the U.S. Probation Officers do a very thorough and accurate examination of
defendant's prior criminal conduct. A pre-sentence investigation may very well determine that in light ofthe
above described legislation, your client may not be disqualified from possessing a firearm at all. At worst, the
preliminary pre-sentence report will more fully inform you
and your client ofthe potential exposure he or she faces.
As outlined below, your client's potential length ofincarceration is very much a factor ofhis or her prior criminal

record.
As to the interstate commerce element, it is sufficient
that the government shows that the firearm was manufactured outside the state where the defendant possessed it. 24
This too is an element typically handled for expediency's
sake by stipulation. Since the Supreme Court's decision
in United States v. Lopez,25 there have been some rumblings that more may be required in the way ofa showing
of a measurable or substantial effect on interstate commerce. 26 However, in recent decisions the Fourth Circuit
has declined to read into Lopez, and its progeny, any
greater burden than that outlined above. 27
The same precepts that govern other crimes having
a possessory element govern the possession element of a
Section 922(g)( 1) violation. 28 The government need not
prove the defendant had actual or exclusive possession
ofa firearm; constructive or joint possession is sufficient. 29
The government may prove constructive possession by
demonstrating that the defendant exercised, or had the
power to exercise, dominion and control over the firearm.30 On that basis, the Fourth Circuit upheld the conviction of a defendant where the firearm was seized from
a residence in which the defendant had been observed for
two days prior to the execution ofthat warrant although
he was not present at the time ofthe warrant's execution
and in which the defendants personal papers were found
proximate to the seized firearm. 31 Similarly, the court upheld the conviction where the gun was recovered from the
defendant's bedroom, and at the time of his arrest, ammunition ofa matching caliber was found in the defendant's
pocket.32 On the other hand, the court found evidence
insufficient to sustain a conviction where the firearm had
been recovered from under the seat ofthe defendant who
was merely a passenger in an automobile. 33
With respect to joint possession, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed in an unpublished case the firearm conviction of
the driver of a vehicle who never had actual or exclusive
possession of a firearm. 34 In that matter, a front seat passenger was observed by the police pointing a handgun out
the car window, but the court was able to infer, based on
the police chase that followed, that the driver had knowledge ofthe firearm's presence in the car, and had apparently shared in the purpose ofthe passenger's brandishing
that weapon. 35
In my legal experience, the "possession" aspect of
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the crime is the most contested element ofa Section 922(g)
prosecution. 36 As a practical matter, it is more a matter of
advocacy and persuasion as applied to the specific facts
of the case, than knowledge ofthe legal parameters of
"possession" that are key to the disposition ofthese cases.
Quite often, the firearm in issue is not found in the exclusive possession ofthe defendant, as when a gun is found
lying in a vehicle full of passengers. Equally often, the
defendant is not found proximate to the firearm when it is
seized, as when a gun is found in an empty residence.
Normally, it will not be the issue of sufficiency ofthe evidence that determines your client's fate, but rather your
skill in distancing the client from the seized weapon.
Affirmative Defenses

In United States v. Perrin,37 the Fourth Circuit
joined several other circuits38 in ruling that a defendant
charged with a Section 922(g) violation has available to
him or her the claim of self-defense. The court indicated,
however, it was prepared to recognize that defense in only
a very narrow range of cases. 39 To raise the defense of
justification or self-defense, a defendant must produce evidence that would allow the fact-finder to conclude: (1)
the defendant was under an unlawful and present threat of
death or serious bodily injury; (2) the defendant did not
recklessly place himself or herself in a situation where he
would be forced to engage in criminal conduct; (3) the
defendant had no reasonable legal alternative to both the
criminal act and the avoidance of the threatened harm;
and (4) there was a direct causal relationship between the
possession ofthe firearm and the avoidance ofthe threatened harm.40
In its reported decisions on this issue, the Fourth
Circuit emphasized the threat causing the defendant to arm
himself must be imminent. In that regard, the court has
held that even where a defendant's fear of attack may
have been both rational and his true motivation for carrying
a firearm, a self-defense jury instruction was not warranted
in a case where the defendant, in the course ofhis legitimate
profession, was shot eight months previous to his arrest
and had, therefore, purchased a firearm in response to
that earlier attack.41 Moreover, a self-defense jury
instruction was not warranted in a case where two days
prior to the arrest, a shotgun-toting enemy stalked the
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defendant. 42
On the other hand, the court endorsed a self-defense jury instruction in those cases where the threat was
both deadly and immediate. For example, where a defendant without provocation was threatened by a gunman, and then wrestled the gun away from his assailant,
the jury should be properly instructed on self-defense.43
BaiVDetention

Once arrested, the issue ofpre-trial detention is naturaIl y the prime concern of most defendants. In that regard, itis importantto be familiar with 18 U.S.C § 3142
(2000). I will here endeavor to briefly highlight Section
3142 's significant provisions as they affect alleged firearm
violations. Under Section 3142 's statutory scheme, the
government's ability to seek detention of an arrestee is
not plenary. Rather, the government can seek detention
only if the charged conduct is (1) "a crime ofviolence;"
(2) "an offense for which the maximum sentence is life
imprisonment or death;" (3) a controlled substance violation that carries a term often years or more imprisonment;
or (4) a felonyM and the defendant has been previously
convicted ofany combination oftwo or more violent crimes
or narcotics felonies. 45 In addition, the government can
also seek detention ifthe defendant is a serious flight risk
or presents a serious risk that he or she will obstruct or
attempt to obstruct justice.46
Because a defendant who finds himself or herself
charged with a federal handgun violation will typically have
an extensive criminal record, it is usually on the ground
that a defendant has two or more prior violent crime and!
or narcotics felony convictions that the government moves
for detention. As outlined above, in such cases, Section
3142 explicitly authorizes the government to move for
pretrial detention. However, in cases where a defendant
has only one prior conviction for a violent crime or narcotics felony the law is unsettled as to the government's
authority to move for detention. In such cases, usually the
only basis for the government's detention motion would
be that the Section 922(g) violation constitutes a crime of
violence. Although it is long settled that for sentencing
guideline purposes a Section 922(g)(l) violation is not a
"crime ofviolence,"47 it is unclear whether, for Section
3142(f) purposes, a felon in possession charge is a "crime
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ofviolence" that would allow the government to move for
detention.
A "crime of violence" includes those felonies that,
by their nature involve a substantial risk that physical force
against the person or property of another may be used in
the course of committing the offense. In concrete terms,
the issue is whether the government can ask for the detention ofa defendant who, while on parole for a violent felony,
is caught with a loaded firearm on the street in an open-air
drug market, and then charged with a Section 922(g) violation. To date, the Fourth Circuit has not addressed this
issue. Those circuits that have wrestled with this issue
have come to divergent conclusions.48 Indeed, within this
district there has been a split. In United States v. Aiken,49
the court held, as a matter oflaw, a felon in possession
charge constitutes a "crime of violence" for purposes of
Section 3142(f), while Judge Chasanow has more recently
held to the contrary. 50
In those cases where the government is statutorily
authorized to move for the pre-trial detention of a defendant, it must convince the presiding magistrate by clear
and convincing evidence that no condition or combination
ofconditions will reasonably assure the safety ofthe community.51 In making that decision, the magistrate must
consider the following factors:
1. the nature and circumstances ofthe offense
charged;
2. the weight ofthe evidence against the defendant;
3. the history and characteristics ofthe defendant,
including such things as his or her prior criminal
record, employment record, ties to the community, physical and mental condition, and whether at
the time ofthe charged violation the defendant was
under some form of court supervision; and
4. the seriousness ofthe danger to the community
that would be posed by the defendant's release. 52
The hearing in which the detention issue is fleshed
out usually occurs at a time removed from a defendant's
initial appearance before the magistrate. This delay is typically occasioned by a request for continuance made by
either party that must be granted. If the government makes
the continuance request the detention hearing can be delayed for up to three days. If the defendant makes the

continuance request the detention hearing can be delayed
for up to five days. 53 In the interim, an agent of United
States Pretrial Services will interview the defendant, conduct a background investigation, and prepare a report
addressing the factors that must be weighed by the court
in making its decision.
Finally, should either party choose, 18 U.S.C. § 3145
(2000) provides for review by the district court of a
magistrate's detention/release determination. Such reviews
are conducted de novo. 54

Search and Seizures Issues
Search and seizures issues confronted by the practitioner in such cases will vary widely. A comprehensive
treatment ofthose issues in this article is impracticable.
However, as a general matter, firearm seizures result from
an on-the-street encounter or a car stop, or a search
warrant.
In regard to those firearms seized as the result ofthe
execution of a search warrant, the practitioner will want
to be familiar with Arkansas v. Wilson 55 (cases where a
no-knock entry was made); United States v. Lalor6 (issue as to the nexus between the firearm seized and the
residence for which the warrant was sought); Illinois v.
Gates 57 (analysis of what comprises "probable cause");
United States v. Leon58 (for the metes and bounds ofthe
"good faith exception"); and Franks v. Delaware59 (in
those cases where it is suspected the affiant misrepresented
facts to the issuing magistrate).
With regard to those firearms seized as the result of
an on-the-street encounter between the police and your
client, the practitioner will want to be familiar with California v. Hodari D.60 (where the defendant discarded
the drugs during a police chase); United States v.
Mendenha1l61 (an analysis of the point at which an onthe-street encounter becomes a detention for Fourth
Amendment purposes); Terry v. Ohio62 (an analysis of
what amount of evidence is necessary to briefly detain
and frisk a suspect); and JL. v. Florida (in those cases
where the stop was prompted by an anonymous tip).
In regard to those cases arising from a gun found in a
car, the practitioner will want to be acquainted with Delaware v. Prouse63 (for a discussion ofthe quantum of evidence needed to justify a warrantless traffic stop); Michi-
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gan v. Longh4 (for a discussion ofthe lawful scope of a
warrantless search of an automobile made incident to a
Terry-type stop); Maryland v. Wilson 65 (for the proposition that, as part of a lawful traffic stop the police can
order the occupants of a vehicle to get out of the stopped
car); New Yorkv. Belton66 (for a discussion of the lawful
scope of a warrantless search of a car made incident to
the arrest of a car's occupant); Carroll v. United States 67
and United States v. ROSS68 (for discussions ofthe quantum of evidence needed for and the lawful scope of a warrantless search of an automobile).

Sentencing
As outlined above, a defendant who does not qualifY
for enhanced sentencing under 18 U.S.c. § 924(e) faces
a ten-year maximum term of incarceration. In meting out
a sentence in such a case, the judge's sentencing options
are circumscribed by the United States Sentencing Guidelines that, unlike Maryland's sentencing guidelines, are not
merely precatory.
A pair ofnumeric scores drives the federal sentencing guideline scheme. One score involves a defendant's
prior criminal conduct, and is referred to as the Criminal
History Category. The crime for which a defendant is
being sentenced is also accorded a numeric value, and is
referred to as the Offense Level. Where those two scores
intersect on the guideline matrix,69 a range of months is
found. Within that range ofmonths the federal judge must
sentence a convicted defendant to prison.
In ascertaining the appropriate offense level for convictions of18 U.S. C. § 922(g)(I) violations, United States
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1 is the pertinent
reference point. Generally speaking, if a defendant has
previously been convicted ofany combination oftwo "controlled substance offenses"7o or "crimes ofviolence,"71 his
or her offense level is twenty-four. 72 Ifa defendant has
previously been convicted ofonly one narcotics or violent
felony, his or her offense level is twenty.73 There are
certain offense specific adjustments that could enhance or
reduce the offense level depending on the circumstances
ofthe crime ofconviction. As an example, ifthe firearm at
issue was stolen or had an obliterated serial number, that
offense level would be increased two levels. 74 Those adjustments are outlined in U.S.S.U § 2K2.1(b).
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For determining a defendant's criminal history category, Section 4A.l of the United States Sentencing
Guideline Commission manual is the relevant guideline. By
that section, the number of a defendant's previous convictions, the length of imprisonment imposed for those
convictions, and the defendant's status vis-a-vis the criminal
justice system at the time ofthe crime are all factored in
determining the defendant's criminal history category.
As an example, a defendant who, within the past
two years was convicted ofnarcotics distribution, received
a suspended sentence, and who was still on probation at
the time ofthe instant Section 922(g) violation, would by
§ 4A 1.1 's computations have a criminal history category
of II. Having suffered only one previous conviction for a
narcotics or violent felony, this hypothetical defendant's
offense level would be twenty per Section 2Kl.l (a)(4).
Assuming this defendant's conviction came as the result
of a jury trial, his sentencing guideline range would be 3746 months of incarceration. Under such circumstances,
(indeed under almost all circumstances where a defendant has only one prior narcotics or violent felony conviction) a federal sentence would be less than the five-year
minimum mandatory sentence that would attach to a conviction obtained under Maryland's analogous firearms statute. 75
That would certainly not be the case where a defendant convicted of a Section 922(g)( 1) violation suffered
three previous convictions of any combination of "violent
felonies" or "serious drug offenses" committed on occasions different from one another. Under such circumstances, notwithstanding the sentencing provisions outlined
above, per 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (more popularly termed
the Armed Career Criminal Act or "ACCA"), a defendant faces a minimum mandatory fifteen-year term of imprisonment and a maximum life term of incarceration. 76
The term "serious drug offense" is defined at 18
U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A) as any federal narcotics offense
for which the maximum term of imprisonment is ten years
or more; or any state narcotics violation involving the manufacture, distribution or possession with intent to distribute
narcotics for which the maximum term of imprisonment is
ten years or more. By that definition, a conviction for
simple possession of narcotics would not be a "serious
drug offense," and would, therefore, not count as a predicate conviction for ACCA purposes. Under Maryland
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law, the maximum sentence for distribution ofmarijuana is
only five years 77 ; therefore, a conviction for the distribution, manufacture, or possession with intent to distribute
marijuana similarly would not be a "serious drug offense."
In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) defines
"violent felony" as "any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year ... that -- (i) has as
an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." In other words, a
crime will be classified, as a ''violent felony" ifit is specifically so designated, e.g. a burglary has an element involving the use of force, e.g. a murder or robbery,78 or its
commission, involves a serious risk of injury to others.
In Taylor v. United States 79, the Court wrestled with
the issue of how a sentencing court should approach a
defendant's prior criminal record in determining what qualifies as a "violent felony" conviction, where the prior conviction is not explicitly so stamped by Section
924(e)(2)(B). Choosing from among alternative approaches, the Court adopted a "categorical approach," in
which weighing a defendant's prior record, the sentencing
court is required generally "to look only to the fact ofconviction and statutory definition ofthe prior offense." 80
Note that although Taylor usually restricts the district court's inquiry to ascertaining the statutory definition
ofthe prior offense, the Court also recognized that "[t]his
categorical approach ... may permit the sentencing court
to go beyond the mere fact ofconviction in a narrow range
of cases .... "81 On that language, in United States v.
CooJc82, the court held where a crime may be committed
by both violent and nonviolent means, ''the sentencing court
must examine the charging papers and the jury instructions" to determine whether the crime for which the defendant was convicted was done by violent means.
On paper this process sounds simple and straightforward. In practice these determinations have spawned
manifold and wide-ranging appellate decisions. Because
the various states have disparate definitions for similarly
titled crimes, even those crimes explicitly designated in
the ACCA as "violent felonies" are often the subject of
heated appeals. As just one example, before Maryland
re-codified its breaking and entering statutes in 1994, ''bur-

glary" was defined as "the breaking and entering of the
dwelling house ofanother in the nighttime with the intent
to commit a felony. "83 In Missouri, however, a burglary
conviction could result from the unlawful entering ofa building for the purpose of committing a crime therein84 irrespective of whether the building entered was a dwelling,
the entry occurred at night, or the crime intended was a
felony or misdemeanor. In having to choose from a host
of possible definitions, federal courts were, therefore,
faced with the difficult task of determining what constitutes a burglary for Section 924(e)(2)(B).
In addressing this dilemma, the TaylorB 5 Court concluded Congress did not have intend the crime of "burglary" to have a variety ofmeanings varying the impact of
prior convictions for like crimes depending on the state
where a defendant's prior convictions occurred. Instead,
the Court reasoned "Congress meant by 'burglary' the
generic sense in which the term is now used in the criminal
codes ofmost States ... , [a crime which] contains at least
the following elements: an unlawful or unprivileged entry
into, or remaining in, a building or other structure, with
intent to commit a crime. "86 Thus, what under Maryland
law had historically been deemed a "storehouse breaking" would for Section 924(e) purposes be considered a
''burglary.''87
Even more problematic is discerning the effect ofprior
convictions for crimes not explicitly categorized as "violent felonies," defined as those crimes involving a serious
risk of injury to others. Although not having an element
the intentional application offorce, such crimes as escape88
and involuntary manslaughter9have been construed as
"violent felonies" because their commission in all cases
involves a serious potential risk ofphysical injury. There
are other crimes where the commission involves a significant risk of injury to others (e.g., resisting arrest90 and
possession of a firearm in relation to a drug trafficking
crime),91 which perhaps could perhaps serve as predicate
crimes under the ACCA and which undoubtedly the appellate courts will be asked to construe in the future.
Where the prior conviction was for a crime that can
be committed by either violent or non-violent means, the
sentencing court may consider the charging document underlying that prior conviction, the instructions made to the
jury at the trial of that crime92 and the pre-sentence reports prepared as an aid for sentencing that prior convic33.1 U. Bait. L.F. 7
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tion. 93 In United States v. Coleman, the issue was
whether a previous common-law assault conviction should
count as a "violent felony" conviction. A common law
assault may encompass some conduct that does not involve the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. 94 In determining whether that prior assault conviction was a ''violent felony" for Section 924(e) purposes,
the district court properly referred to the probable cause
statement that accompanied the statement of charges. The
probable cause statement indicated, that in the course of
the alleged assault Coleman pointed a gun at a police officer. On this basis, the circuit court concluded that
Coleman's prior assault conviction was properly categorized as a "violent felony."
Often the pre-sentence report will note several previous convictions that share a common sentencing date.
For instance, if the police arrest a burglar who is subsequently charged with multiple burglaries that occurred over
the course of a month, the burglar may end up pleading,
and being sentenced to a number ofburglaries at one time.
Under such circumstances, the issue becomes whether
those prior offenses were "committed on occasions different from one another." Iftreated as having been committed on separate occasions, each burglary charge would
be separately counted as a qualifying conviction for Section 924(e) purposes. If not, the convictions would count
collectively as only one prior conviction, and a significantly
different sentence would be meted out. Convictions occur "on occasions different from one another" if each of
the prior convictions arose out of a separate and distinct
criminal episode. 95 Courts have applied a variety offactors to determine whether multiple convictions constitute
separate and distinct criminal episodes, including whether
the offenses arose in different geographic locations, whether
the natures ofthe offenses were substantially different and
whether the offenses involved different victims and different criminal objectives. 96 In the above scenario, the burglar who in a single court proceeding had been convicted
and sentenced for multiple burglaries would likely be treated
as an armed career criminal and would face a minimum
mandatory fifteen-year term ofimprisonment.
The ability of counsel to attack the viability ofthose
prior convictions is sharply circumscribed. In a case where
the defendant sought to have the sentencing court review
his previous convictions on the grounds that he was inef-
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fectively represented by counsel, the Supreme Court held
with the sole exception ofthose prior convictions where
the court failed to appoint counsel for the defendant, the
defendant in a federal sentencing proceeding has no right
to collaterally attack his previous convictions at his sentencing for a federal firearm violation. 97
Finally, once it is determined that a defendant is subject to the provisions of the ACCA, the pertinent sentencing guideline is found in Section 4B 1.4 ofthe United
States Sentencing Guideline Manual. Under Section
4B 1.4, a defendant's criminal history category will never
be lower that Category IV,98 and a defendant's offense
level will never be lower than thirty-three.99 Therefore,
the lowest sentencing guideline range for an ACCA-qualified defendant convicted at trial of a Section 922(g)(1)
violation is from 188 to 235 months.
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